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Abstract. Recent studies have highlighted the instrumental use of language, wherein actors 
deploy claims to strategically pursue policy goals in the absence of persuasion or socialization. 
Yet these accounts are insufficiently attentive to the social context in which an audience assesses 
and responds to strategic appeals. I present a theoretical account that highlights the distinctly 
powerful role of international law in framing strategic argumentation. Legalized discourses are 
especially legitimate because law is premised on a set of internally coherent practices that 
constitute actors and forms of action. I then illustrate the implications in a hard case concerning 
US efforts to secure immunities from International Criminal Court jurisdiction. Contrary to 
realist accounts of law as a tool of the powerful, I show that both pro- and anti-ICC diplomacy 
was channelled through a legal lens that imposed substantial constraints on the pursuit of policy 
objectives. Court proponents responded to US diplomatic pressure with their own legal 
arguments; this narrowed the scope of the exemptions, even as the Security Council temporarily 
conceded to US demands. While the US sought to marry coercion with argumentative appeals, it 
failed to generate a lasting change in global practice concerning ICC jurisdiction. 
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 Introduction 
 
The field of International Relations has become increasingly occupied with the role of language 
in world politics. Important contributions by rationalist scholars emphasizing the calculated 
deployment of rhetoric2 and communicative accounts that highlight the truth-seeking and 
consensus-building purpose of argumentation3 have sought to clarify the various logics and 
effects of speech acts. This article further attends to this discussion through a focused 
investigation of the role of legal rhetoric in international diplomacy. To do so, it proposes a 
theoretical conception of strategic argumentation through law. Following recent studies,4 I 
contend that many international debates can be conceptualized as strategic interactions, wherein 
actors deploy various claims in an attempt to compel other participants to accept their proposed 
policy. This account does not assume that actors enter into debates with the expectation of 
altering their own underlying preferences, or that successful outcomes require such change in 
others. While participants would prefer to persuade their interlocutors to change their views and 
endorse a given approach (since this would result in a more stable outcome), they are content in 
the short term to use reasoned arguments to shift the political terrain such that competing 
claims—and the attendant policies—are no longer regarded as politically advantageous. In this 
case, it is not necessary for all actors to genuinely agree with the stated policy, but simply to be 
                                                 
2 Frank Schimmelfennig, 'The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the 
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union', International Organization, 55:1 (2001), pp. 47–
80. 
3 Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller, 'Theoretical Paradise – Empirically Lost? Arguing with 
Habermas', Review of International Studies, 31:1 (2005), pp. 167–79; Roger A. Payne, 
'Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction', European Journal of International Relations, 7:1 
(2001), pp. 37–61; Thomas Risse, '"Let’s Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics,' 
International Organization, 54:1 (2000), pp. 1–39.  
4 Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The 
Power of Political Rhetoric', European Journal of International Relations, 13:1 (2007), pp. 35–
66. 
 given sufficient grounds on which to concede the point and adapt their behaviour to meet the 
other side’s demands. This account is therefore sensitive to the methodological challenges 
inherent in studying cognitive changes that underpin accounts of persuasion.5  
Yet even the self-interested employment of rhetoric requires an audience to assess and 
respond to competing claims and in this way, my account shares assumptions from the 
constructivist literature concerning the intersubjective basis for effective arguing.6 Actors 
seeking to generate acceptance, if not genuine endorsement, of their views cannot employ just 
any claim at random, but must instead frame their arguments within recognized boundaries. 
Hence, even strategic argumentation, and the tactical concessions it seeks to compel, is rooted in 
shared understandings that provide a framework for determining the more compelling claim. The 
social setting in which rhetorical contestation occurs thus provides structural constraints that 
limit the range of claims that will be considered acceptable to the wider audience.  
Accounts of rhetorical action and coercion have acknowledged the necessary role of 
audience dynamics, but have left the description of its substance underdeveloped. Elaborating on 
recent constructivist accounts, I contend that the social structure of international law provides the 
basis for a shared environment in which strategic argumentation may take place.7 Law is defined 
                                                 
5 Ibid.; Tine Hanrieder, 'The False Promise of the Better Argument', International Theory, 3:3 
(2011), pp. 390–415.  
6 Deitelhoff and Müller, 'Theoretical Paradise – Empirically Lost?'; Harald Müller, 'Arguing, 
Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of 
Appropriateness in International Relations,' European Journal of International Relations, 10:3 
(2004), pp. 395–435; Payne, 'Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction'; Risse, '"Let’s 
Argue!"'. 
7 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
Interactional Account (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Jutta 
Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, 'Constructivism and International Law', in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and 
Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International 
Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 119–45; 
Martha J. Finnemore and Stephen Toope, 'Alternatives to Legalization: Richer Views of Law and 
 by an internal logic of justification based in precedent that constitutes actors and appropriate 
forms of action. When actors argue via legal means they seek to validate particular behaviours or 
policies as conforming to, or violating, established principles, rules and norms that are bound up 
in the practice of legality. These can be distinguished from, and are intersubjectively recognized 
as superior to, more politicized forms of rhetoric that explicitly invoke self-interest to the general 
exclusion of principled justifications.8 In sum, strategic argumentation seeks to gain acceptance 
for a particular policy goal from other relevant actors by invoking claims that are mutually 
comprehensible. Legal arguments are especially powerful in such contests because they are 
connected to the social construction of international society, and therefore represent an especially 
legitimate source of justification.  
This account of strategic legal argumentation has two specific implications. First, in 
multilateral settings actors will tend to invoke justifications based in legal principles, norms and 
rules—potentially in conjunction with coercive efforts—in pursuing policy goals. This strategy is 
preferable even when the actor making a claim does not fully endorse the standards it employs. 
Yet due to the particular discursive structure and authority of international law, even the cynical 
invocation of law can impose important limitations on freedom of action, by narrowing the scope 
of future argumentation and making actions subject to retrospective assessment on the basis of 
these prior claims. States may then become rhetorically entrapped and face politically 
consequential challenges linked to factual disputes (challenges regarding their interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Politics', International Organization, 55:3 (2001), pp. 743–58; Christian Reus-Smit, 'Politics and 
International Legal Obligation', European Journal of International Relations, 9:4 (2003), pp. 
591–625. 
8 Christian Reus-Smit, 'The Politics of International Law', in Christian Reus-Smit (ed.), The 
Politics of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 14–44; 
Shirley V. Scott and Olivia Ambler, 'Does Legality Really Matter? Accounting for the Decline in 
US Foreign Policy Legitimacy Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq', European Journal of 
International Relations, 13:1 (2007), 67–87. 
 the law) or claims of hypocrisy (not upholding their purported commitments). Under these 
circumstances, resistance from the target audience can increase the costs of a proposed policy 
leading to its abandonment.9 Second, legal discourses provide a reservoir of meaning which less 
materially powerful actors can exploit to challenge dominant states and promote their own policy 
goals. Arguing via law entails a transformation of power into a social commodity wherein 
material capabilities are wedded to, and altered by, forms of legitimating power to produce 
outcomes.10 This account therefore challenges realist conceptions of law in which preponderantly 
powerful states merely use legal institutions to pursue their own self-interested goals while 
remaining essentially immune from legal constraints not to their liking.11  
I illustrate these theoretical claims with close attention to a series of diplomatic efforts by 
the United States to challenge the scope of International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction at the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). From its inception, the ICC was the subject of a wide-
ranging and aggressive US campaign to secure special exemptions from the ICC’s criminal 
accountability regime. Proponents of an independent Court sought to resist US demands without 
recourse to parallel threats or incentives, but instead through the force of argument. On its face, 
this latter strategy would appear unpromising, as prominent theories of International Relations 
hold that preponderantly powerful actors will leverage their military and economic advantages to 
assert their will in the international system. Indeed, given the degree of its opposition, the ICC 
                                                 
9 Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Heather Smith-Cannoy, Insincere Commitments: Human Rights Treaties, Abusive States, and 
Citizen Activism (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012). 
10 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in International Politics', International 
Organization, 59:1 (2005), pp. 39–75. 
11 Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism after Kosovo 
(New York: Palgrave, 2001); Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International 
Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 would seem like a case where the United States was most likely to contest—and ideally 
reverse—the reach of the new institution; the use of reasoned discourse to counteract this threat 
should have little impact when confronted with such material disparities. Assessing the impact of 
legal claim making under these challenging conditions thus provides a strong test of my account 
of strategic legal argumentation and policy change.  
Despite these apparent impediments, pro- and anti-ICC diplomacy was channelled 
through a legal lens that imposed substantial constraints on the pursuit of policy objectives. Both 
the ICC’s most prominent detractor and its proponents employed a variety of claims concerning 
specific ICC rules and broader principles of international law in support of their preferred 
interpretation of the Court’s prospective jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states. While the 
US retained forms of coercion, they were tempered by a rhetorical strategy that sought to justify 
American policy within the specific parameters of international legal practice and the rules of an 
institution it openly rejected. Yet the decision to pursue a legal mode of justification exposed US 
claims to unfavourable assessment as both factually incorrect and hypocritical. In the face of 
sustained pressure, ICC parties were able to assemble an alternative narrative that joined 
technical legal interpretations with a set of claims concerning the appropriate conduct within the 
international legal order. In the short term this had the effect of substantially narrowing the scope 
of the special exemptions, even as the Security Council temporarily conceded to US demands. In 
the longer term, however, the US position proved socially unsustainable. The United States was 
therefore unable to leverage its superior political, military and economic capabilities to generate 
a lasting acceptance of its claim to ICC immunities.  
My most fundamental contention, therefore, is that the invocation of legal claims tempers 
and constrains the use of coercive tactics such that the deployment of material power resources 
 has different—and more modest—effects than it would in a non-argumentative and especially 
non-legal setting. Indeed, US actions have paradoxically reinforced the ICC through a process of 
legal claim making that was intended to do the exact reverse. Hence the US pursuit of its 
interests had unintended consequences precisely due to the way in which international social 
meaning is generated via legal argumentation. In this way, the present article takes up Brunnée 
and Toope’s call for scholars to “focus more attention on empirical studies that illustrate the 
distinctiveness of law… and that explore how that distinctiveness plays out in specific contexts 
and issue areas.”12 In so doing, the article makes two principal theoretical contributions. On the 
one hand, it furthers the integration of instrumental and norm-based logics, by showing how the 
strategic use of principled arguments interacts with material forces to affect policy outcomes. On 
the other hand, it attends to an ongoing debate among International Relations and International 
Law scholars, by providing further evidence regarding the means through which international 
law serves as a source of legitimate authority in real-world settings.13 Finally, the article provides 
empirical detail to uncover the practical consequences of diplomacy—and the status of a key 
feature of the ICC’s legal regime—under conditions of great power resistance. 
 
Strategic Action, Audiences and Argumentation in World Politics 
Defining Strategic Argumentation 
                                                 
12 Brunnée and Toope, 'Constructivism and International Law,' p. 139. 
13 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law; Ian Johnstone, The Power 
of Deliberation: International Law, Politics and Organizations (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011); Steven R. Ratner, 'Persuading to Comply: On the Development and Avoidance of 
Legal Argumentation', in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 568–90; Reus-Smit, 'Politics and International Legal 
Obligation'; Scott and Ambler, 'Does Legality Really Matter?'. 
 Arguing is central to political life in both domestic and international societies. I employ a 
common sense definition of arguing as the use of reasons—whether verbal or written—to justify 
a particular policy to a target audience, with the intention of causing these actors to alter their 
behaviour accordingly. Yet my approach differs from the most common usage in IR by relaxing 
the assumption that arguing implies a change in the beliefs or opinions of audience members. 
Scholars of communicative action contend that argumentative rationality is premised on the 
creation of shared understandings in which actors must be open to changing their own views on 
the basis of a better argument.14 Instead, I propose a conception of strategic argumentation in 
which persuasion and socialization is not necessary to generate meaningful change in 
international outcomes. While actors would prefer to change the minds of their target audience—
since this would result in a more lasting solution in their favour—in the short term the purpose 
can be to shift the strategic terrain such that other arguments are no longer sustainable.  
In this form of rhetorical contestation, two or more parties present competing claims 
concerning a purported problem and a policy solution that follows from their framing. The goal 
is to deploy arguments that are acceptable to the wider audience of participating actors and in 
that way deny the opposing claimant(s) equally suitable rhetorical grounds for continuing the 
debate. Hence, “winning” an argument on these terms does not require a fundamental shift in 
actor identities or preferences, but can more simply be achieved if the other side determines that 
it is no longer worth continuing the contest, and alters its behaviour in order to meet the demands 
of its interlocutor. The “losing” side may not have been persuaded of the validity of its 
                                                 
14 Deitelhoff and Müller, 'Theoretical Paradise – Empirically Lost?'; Johnstone, The Power of 
Deliberation; Müller, 'Arguing, Bargaining and All That'; Ratner, 'Persuading to Comply'; Risse, 
'"Let’s Argue!"'. 
 opponent’s argument, but acquiesces to the policy demand so as to avoid audience sanctions or 
the sheer cost of further argumentation.15  
My account is closely related to existing conceptions of “rhetorical action” and 
“rhetorical coercion,”16 though I prefer the term strategic argumentation. This retains the focus 
on the deliberate and self-interested use of language to achieve policy goals, and does not seek to 
account for changes in cognitive beliefs of states, bureaucratic organizations or individual human 
subjects. At the same time, the explicit reference to arguing draws attention to the salience of 
principled claims at the root of strategic action. Argumentation—whether meeting the conditions 
of genuine deliberation or not—is based in factual statements about how the world works, or 
normative claims concerning what should be done. It is also interactive, as members of the target 
audience will respond with their own reasoned claims. Legitimate international authority is 
ultimately sustained as much by intersubjective justification as by the raw application of force. 
The present account thus shares the assumption of communicative action that the valorization of 
reasoned claims leads to a diminishment of material power resources that characterize bargaining 
and coercion.17 And while argumentation assumes that all aspects of discourse are open to 
contestation, the ability to advance claims, and respond to those proposed by others, requires at 
least some minimum degree of stability in the underlying social structure. The meaning of social 
norms and legal rules is never fully solidified, though to the extent that they bear upon actors at a 
particular moment in time, institutions may be studied as effectively fixed entities.18 
                                                 
15 Krebs and Jackson, 'Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms,' pp. 43–45; Schimmelfennig, 'The 
Community Trap,' p. 64. 
16 Schimmelfennig, 'The Community Trap'; Krebs and Jackson, 'Twisting Tongues and Twisting 
Arms.' 
17 Müller, 'Arguing, Bargaining and All That', p. 397; Risse, '"Let’s Argue!"', p 9. 
18 Benjamin R. Banta, 'Analysing Discourse as a Causal Mechanism', European Journal of 
International Relations, 19:2 (2013), p. 390. 
 For these reasons, the public language of diplomacy is causally significant for outcomes 
in world politics irrespective of the internal dispositions of subject actors.19 Whether actors are 
fundamentally transformed by argumentative practices, their actions are conditioned by the 
social setting in which both calculated use of rhetoric and genuine truth-seeking take place. This 
insight generates theoretical expectations concerning the consequences of public utterances that 
can be traced in the empirical record. Both rationalist and constructivist scholars have 
highlighted potential audience costs when actors violate their own previously articulated 
standards; these may take the form of material sanctions, or social rewards and punishments tied 
to status within a community.20 In my account, the deployment of strategic argumentation can 
lead actors to become rhetorically entrapped by a more effective alternative frame, and concede 
to the will of their opponent by dropping the argument and revising their behaviour accordingly. 
Regardless of the motivations, therefore, the credibility and consistency of claims bears upon 
their reception and the perceived legitimacy of associated policies.  
    
Audience Dynamics and the Impact of Claims 
Diplomacy takes place via justificatory discourse, and in this way implicates some audience of 
other actors in the deployment and reception of claims. This is made explicit in accounts of 
communicative action, but strategic environments are also underpinned by a social setting in 
which rhetorical contests can be adjudicated. Instrumental theories of compliance acknowledge 
that actors reside within a community of similarly-situated others, and that the constitutive norms 
                                                 
19 Banta, 'Analysing Discourse as a Causal Mechanism'; Krebs and Jackson, 'Twisting Tongues 
and Twisting Arms.' 
20 Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation; Ratner, 
'Persuading to Comply'; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights; 
Schimmelfennig, 'The Community Trap'.  
 of this community inform—but do not strictly determine—the self-interested pursuit of policy 
goals.21 More specifically, since meanings in the international system cannot be imposed 
unilaterally, models of rhetorical action presume that target subjects must accept or reject the 
proposed arguments.22 As a practical matter, therefore, actors must be attentive to the content of 
their claims, and seek to tie their particular appeals to widely recognized community standards 
since this will increase the chances of their argument being accepted. Collectively held views 
concerning the appropriateness of certain discourses and behaviours thus strongly condition and 
constrain the type of claims that actors may make in legitimating their policies.  
Yet this still leaves open the vital question of why some arguments resonate more 
effectively with an audience. The instrumental accounts surveyed above do not offer much 
insight into how the specific content of claims should impact upon their reception beyond the 
general conclusion that the quality of arguments matters. For Schimmelfennig, actors deploy 
arguments in view of a general “standard of legitimacy” in which the most valid arguments are 
those that are deemed to most closely adhere to the accepted normative structure of values and 
beliefs.23 Krebs and Jackson employ a minimal conception in which an argument “wins” when 
“its grounds are socially sustainable — because the audience deems certain rhetorical 
deployments acceptable and others impermissible.”24 But neither explanation gets to the bottom 
of the content of these necessary determinations and why certain arguments are judged to be 
better in the first place – or, to put it differently, what constitutes the prevailing standard of 
legitimacy which may be acted upon. I contend that we can provide greater precision in accounts 
                                                 
21 Guzman, How International Law Works; Schimmelfennig, 'The Community Trap'.  
22 Krebs and Jackson, 'Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms', p. 45. 
23 Schimmelfennig, 'The Community Trap', p. 63. 
24 Krebs and Jackson, 'Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms', p. 47. 
 of rhetoric and argumentation by drawing attention to the particular role of international law as 
an authoritative source of claims in the international community of states.  
 
Strategic Argumentation Through International Law 
The assertion that international law serves as a primary source of legitimate authority in the 
international system is not novel, as legal scholars have long recognized.25 However, 
international law as a field academic inquiry has tended to emphasize the formal doctrinal 
sources of law and has consequently been less inclined to reflect on the social origins of the 
legitimacy—and hence obligatory status—that law is said to command.26 Despite extensive 
efforts at bridge building, IR scholars have been slow to capitalize on these insights.27 Law is 
understood to be distinct from—yet related to—other ideational phenomena like social norms or 
moral values and material forces like military or economic capacity. Yet the relationship to the 
substantive context of argumentation, and hence the particular difference that legal discourses 
are expected to make in comparison to other forms of agency, is often under-specified.28 
                                                 
25 For a classic statement see Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990). More recently see Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the 
Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). Legal scholars have also explored the enactment of legal 
argumentation and interpretation in a variety of settings. See for example Ian Johnstone, 
'Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument', European Journal of 
International Law, 14:3 (2003), pp. 437–80; and Steven R. Ratner, 'Does International Law 
Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?', New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics, 32:3 (2000), pp. 591–698.  
26 Michael Byers, 'International Law', in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncal Snidal (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 613; Reus-Smit, 'Politics and International Legal Obligation'.  
27 For recent overviews see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor, and Yonatan Lupu, 
'Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field', The American Journal 
of International Law, 106:1 (2012), pp. 47–97; and Byers, 'International Law'.  
28 Ratner, 'Persuading to Comply', p. 572. 
 Following recent constructivist accounts,29 I contend that legal institutions represent a powerful 
source of authority in the international system because law is intimately bound up in the social 
construction of international actors and acceptable forms of action. The structure of legal 
reasoning thus provides the necessary shared expectations that underpin both 
communicative/deliberative and strategic/instrumental forms of arguing.  
 
The Social Structure of International Law as a Reservoir of Legitimacy 
Constructivist IR theory has made significant contributions in conceptualizing international law 
as part of a multifaceted social system. In this account, law is not defined by a by a strictly 
enumerated set of binding rules backed by sanctions—as per rationalist “hard law” 
approaches30—but rather encompasses a particular mode of practice based in precedent that 
generates categories of meaning and more specific permissive and prohibitionary standards. 
International law’s essence is rooted in a principled justificatory discourse that channels present 
debates over the meaning and scope of law through reference to previously articulated rules and 
procedures.31 In so doing, actors engage in a continual process of making and evaluating claims 
concerning the prescriptive and proscriptive status of law. These associated repertoires of ideas, 
                                                 
29 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law; Finnemore and Toope, 
'Alternatives to Legalization'; Reus-Smit, 'Politics and International Legal Obligation'; Christian 
Reus-Smit (ed.), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
30 Kenneth W. Abbott et al., 'The Concept of Legalization,' International Organization, 54:3 
(2000), pp. 401–20; Alexander Thompson, 'Coercive Enforcement of International Law', in 
Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International 
Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), pp. 502–23. 
31 Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation; Ratner, 'Persuading to Comply'.  
 behaviours and language comprise the intersubjective practices that structure international legal 
action, and aggregate over time as precedents that increasingly bind participants to positions.32  
The development and enactment of international law is thus intimately associated with 
the social construction of international actors and the definition of acceptable and unacceptable 
forms of action. A central insight of recent constructivist work is that “legal practices are 
embedded within, and constituted by, layers of nested social understandings.”33 The authoritative 
nature of law is derived from its connection to fundamental normative structures that act as 
ordering principles to demarcate the constituent units of the system and structure subsequent 
efforts to develop frameworks for appropriate conduct. In the contemporary international system, 
conceptions of territorially based sovereign statehood, contractual international law, the sanctity 
of commitments (pacta sunt servanda) and multilateral diplomacy operate both as a precondition 
for mutual recognition and foundational rules of the game through which actors pursue their 
policy goals.34 In turn, they provide the impetus for the development of particular normative 
systems that constitute the features of “responsible” statehood—defining acceptable behaviour in 
issues such as the conduct of warfare, the nature of human rights and proper representation in 
political communities—that may be further articulated as more precise norms and rules.  
This social density explains why actors to regard law as an especially legitimate form of 
order and, consequently, how a generalized obligation towards the law develops. Legal 
institutions emerge from the intersubjective practices of actors and are thereby nested within the 
                                                 
32 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, 'International Practices', International Theory, 3:1 (2011), 
pp. 1–36. 
33 Christian Reus-Smit, 'Obligation through Practice', International Theory, 3:2 (2011), p. 344. 
34 Christian Reus-Smit, 'The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of 
Fundamental Institutions', International Organization, 51:4 (1997), pp. 555–89; Friedrich V. 
Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning 
in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
 underlying normative structure of the system.35 While the resort to law is undoubtedly driven in 
part by the desire of state actors to advance self-interested goals like improving organizational 
efficiency, bolstering reputation or exerting their will, these considerations are given meaning by 
a pre-existing belief that the international legal system possesses legitimate authority worthy of 
adherence.36 In this way, legal institutions contribute to the reconstruction of actor interests and 
subsequent behaviours, meaning that “politics may take a distinctive form when conducted 
within the realm of legal reasoning and practice.”37 
Conceiving of law as a core feature of the international social system suggests how the 
shared understandings essential to effective argumentation action may develop among self-
interested actors. Schimmelfennig and Krebs and Jackson recognize that the social legitimacy of 
claims is central to their reception and hence, impact, but do not extensively develop this 
important point. I contend that since international law helps to constitute international politics, it 
comprises an authoritative source of collective validity claims and a basic grammar “in which 
speakers anchor their arguments.”38 Actors may not agree about the fundamental correctness of 
specific claims—which is not necessary in a strategic account—but the resort to legal argument 
provides a shared language for determining the minimal acceptability of competing positions. 
One key consequence is that while politics and law are co-constituted, actors regard the 
international legal realm as a partially autonomous field of action in which different ground rules 
apply.39 Legal discourses can be distinguished from political forms of argumentation by the fact 
                                                 
35 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law; Reus-Smit, 'Politics and 
International Legal Obligation'; Reus-Smit, 'Obligation through Practice'.  
36 Reus-Smit, 'Politics and International Legal Obligation', p. 613. 
37 Reus-Smit, 'The Politics of International Law', p. 14. 
38 Deitelhoff and Müller, 'Theoretical Paradise – Empirically Lost?', p. 172. 
39 Reus-Smit, 'The Politics of International Law', pp. 36–37; Scott and Ambler, 'Does Legality 
Really Matter?'. 
 that the former are framed in the context of agreed standards informed by precedent while the 
latter tend to invoke more transitory concerns for self-interest (what benefits a given party in the 
particular situation) unencumbered by principled justification. For these reasons, law is typically 
held to be more technocratic and impartial in contrast to an unregulated political realm in which 
material power is expected to dominate.40 Of course law is never truly divorced from power, as 
dominant actors create and interpret legal institutions in the pursuit of their own egoistic policy 
preferences.41 Yet while profoundly shaped by material realities, a transition to a legalized mode 
of justification channels and moderates these forces through a particular social process that is 
generally regarded as more legitimate in its application and adjudication. For this reason, 
“[w]hen an actor in world politics makes reference to international law he or she is implying that 
international law offers the highest standard against which action in world politics can be judged; 
if offering an argument based on international law it is a justification ‘other than’ or ‘more than’ 
a mere political, economic, or moral, rationale.”42 
 
Strategic Legal Argumentation and Its Consequences 
While commonly associated with forms of deliberation, the above account is also compatible 
with the strategic assumptions adopted in this article. An actor will seek to gain support for—or 
at least acquiescence to—its policy by reference to the most compelling constellation of claims it 
can muster. The particular authority that international law enjoys means that actors will prefer to 
                                                 
40 Shirley V. Scott, 'International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between 
International Law and International Politics', European Journal of International Law, 5:1 (1994), 
pp. 313–25. 
41 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Michael Byers and Georg Nolte (eds.), United States 
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 invoke legal claims in their diplomacy, and effective arguing must adhere as closely as possible 
to the prevailing interpretations of relevant law. Similarly, the target audience should assess 
competing claims on their merits, and the legal content of arguments will shape their reception; 
this is so even in the many instances where actor beliefs do not change during the argumentative 
episode. Law is by its nature inherently contested, but it is not infinitely malleable; at any given 
point in time, actors still operate in relation to the existing legal institutions even as they may 
seek to modify or replace them. Hence while actors enjoy considerable flexibility in choosing 
how to present their arguments, the range of possible claims is bounded by contemporary legal 
practice.  
Strategic legal argumentation proceeds via analogy, as parties attempt to justify their 
particular arguments by linking them to widely accepted standards operating at two different 
levels of generality. First, actors may invoke specific legal rules, whether found in a treaty or 
other source. The relative precision of legal texts may increase their impact in argumentative 
episodes, since they tend to permit a more limited scope for interpretation and deviation.43 Yet 
reference to rules in isolation is often insufficient to provide definitive answers concerning the 
meaning and limits of law. For this reason, actors will typically seek to further root their claims 
in a second set of higher-order norms spanning an array of concerns relating to conceptions of 
appropriate action (e.g., ending impunity for grave crimes), status (e.g., equality under law) and 
the nature of legal obligation itself (e.g., voluntary consent as the basis of adopting 
commitments). The existence of multiple sources of authority does not eliminate interpretive 
dilemmas, therefore, but the structure of international law provides an agreed framework through 
which the pursuit of policy goals via principled arguments can take place.  
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 Material power is never absent in international politics, but when deployed within a legal 
setting it is transformed, leading to outcomes that are substantially different from those that 
would be expected if law were mere “cheap talk.” The move to a legal setting can empower 
weaker actors to overcome structural disparities by advancing more authoritative arguments in an 
environment in which forms of coercive force have receded.44 At the same time, because rules 
are embedded within the extensive network of social practice, they provide a resource that may 
be exploited by states that are not formal members. But by invoking rules—even those they do 
not officially endorse—in an effort to advance their own narrow self-interest, resistant states are 
simultaneously drawn into debates about the scope of these institutions and may then be 
challenged on the validity of their interpretation concerning what a given rule permits or forbids. 
These factual disagreements may be further parlayed into claims of hypocrisy—in effect pointing 
out discrepancies between an actor’s rhetoric and behaviour that undercut its purported good 
faith application of the law—leading to increasing social pressures to comply with the new 
standard. In other words, while non-parties may avoid the binding legal effect of new rules, they 
are never able to fully isolate themselves from these developments, and attempts to 
instrumentalize the law can generate unintended consequences that are difficult to control. 
 The core claim of this article is thus presented in the form of a counterfactual, that 
without the constraining effects of legal discourse, the United States would have been able to 
leverage its preponderant material power advantages to gain concessions that much more closely 
adhered to its initial demands.45 Counterfactual analysis is an especially useful means of 
                                                 
44 Deitelhoff and Müller, 'Theoretical Paradise – Empirically Lost?', p. 170–171; Johnstone, The 
Power of Deliberation, pp. 6–7; Risse, '"Let’s Argue!"', pp. 21–22. 
45 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for encouraging me to develop this point more 
explicitly, and for suggesting this framing of the counterfactual. 
 adjudicating amongst an array of possibilities that cannot be observed directly.46 In establishing 
these scenarios, however, attention must be paid to selecting theoretically and logically coherent 
possibilities: the more closely proposed counterfactuals follow the actual flow of events, the 
greater their analytical leverage. This can be achieved by identifying critical points from which 
alternative historical pathways could plausibly have emerged. If strategic argumentation were 
operative therefore, we should expect to see public discourse increasingly coalesce around a set 
of specific statements relating to context-appropriate legal standards, and policy outcomes shift 
in favour of the more widely accepted position. This should occur largely irrespective of the 
distribution of material capabilities between interlocutors. By contrast, an alternative explanation 
emphasizing material power would expect the US to deploy forms of coercion—possibly in 
concert with arguments—to gain acquiescence to its policy goals without substantial concessions 
to its opponents. In this view, while legal rhetoric is one potential strategy a powerful state may 
employ, the back-and-forth of strategic claim making will not significantly alter either its goals 
or the outcome of the episode; more fundamental forms of power politics will always be decisive 
in driving international diplomacy. Hence a predominant power may invoke law as a 
smokescreen for its interests, but move to a legal sphere should not stop it from getting its way 
on its terms.47  
 
Strategic Legal Argumentation and the ICC 
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 Background 
The ICC is the first permanent international court aimed at investigating and prosecuting 
individual human beings for acts of atrocity, and thus reinforces a recent expansion of 
international law to include individuals as subjects of criminal responsibility and punishment.48 
The Rome Statute reverses established diplomatic norms by removing the protected legal status 
of Heads of State and other high officials,49 and further adopts two forms of jurisdiction that 
apply to crimes committed by the nationals of a State Party in any geographic location, or by the 
citizens of any state on the territory of a State Party.50 While stopping short of permitting 
universal jurisdiction therefore, the Statute leaves open the possibility that nationals from non-
parties may be subject to ICC prosecution even though their governments do not accept the 
Court’s authority. This jurisdictional structure has been strongly resisted by the US and other 
prominent Court opponents on the grounds that it violates the foundational tenet that legal 
obligations may not bind third (non-party) states.51 The Rome Statute also gives the Prosecutor 
the power to initiate investigations proprio motu – that is, under his or her own initiative.52 This 
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 goes against the demands of the US and others that the right to launch proceedings would be 
vested with the UNSC, giving the Council effective control over the Court’s operation.53  
Yet this legal regime is complicated by the fact that the Rome Statute provides 
mechanisms for limiting its own application. First, the Statute incorporates, in Article 98, the 
established international practice of granting legal exemption to representatives of other states 
for acts that would normally fall within the jurisdiction of the foreign host. Second and more 
important for the present analysis, Article 16 of the Statute permits the UN Security Council, 
acting under its Chapter VII authority, to request that the Court suspend an active investigation 
or trial for a renewable period of one year. These provisions attempt to strike a delicate balance 
between promoting international justice while acknowledging the importance of principles of 
state sovereignty and non-interference underpinning the international political order.54 Yet the 
implications of these legal innovations are far from settled, and differing views remain 
concerning the extent to which a UNSC resolution would bind the Court and thereby alter the 
operations of an independent international organization.55 For this reason, the strategic 
positioning of claims hinged on competing assertions concerning the scope of Article 16—under 
what conditions the UNSC could limit the Court’s jurisdiction—and by extension the manner in 
which the ICC related to other features of the international legal order. 
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Security Council Politics and the Immunities Debate 
To assess the dynamics of strategic legal argumentation, I focus on a series of debates in the 
Security Council over the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH). The meetings over UNMIBH came at a particularly sensitive moment in the 
consolidation of the ICC, and emerged as a focal point in the shifting US strategy towards the 
Court. While the United States had long harboured serious reservations, these objections 
transformed into overt hostility only once it became clear that the ICC would soon become 
operational with the entry into force of the Rome Statute on July 1, 2002. To that end, US 
representatives sought to secure binding Security Council resolutions that would provide 
permanent exemptions from ICC jurisdiction for military and police forces drawn from non-ICC 
member states deployed on UN-sanctioned operations. 
A large number of states participated in the discussions as Council members or invited 
observers; extensive data thus exists concerning the US view and international responses.56 
Moreover, the UNSC is recognized as a primary setting for the enactment of bargaining, 
argumentation and deliberation.57 Indeed, the meetings in question were explicitly identified by a 
number of delegations as a forum in which to debate appropriate responses and seek a reasoned 
consensus on extent of immunities and the nature of the relationship between the ICC and UN 
system. While such statements imply a measure of flexibility and willingness to be persuaded, it 
                                                 
56 In addition to the usual 15 members, a further 25 states attended the debate over Resolution 
1422 (2002); additionally, Costa Rica spoke on behalf of the other 17 members of the Rio Group, 
while Denmark spoke on behalf of the 15 members of the European Union plus 13 affiliated 
states. In the subsequent 2003 debate over Resolution 1487, 18 observer delegations attended, 
while Greece represented the EU plus 14 affiliated states, and Peru represented the Rio Group.  
57 Johnstone, 'Security Council Deliberations'; Erik Voeten, 'Outside Options and the Logic of 
Security Council Action', American Political Science Review, 95:4 (2001), pp. 845–58. 
 was understood at the time that underlying views were unlikely to change. The principal lines of 
debate thus focused on two main perspectives: that of the United States in seeking to gain 
acceptance for its immunities policy on the one hand, and that of the majority of participating 
states seeking to resist this effort (and thus support the status quo in the Rome Statute), on the 
other. Hence, the resulting interactions are most appropriately conceived as strategic attempts to 
convince the other side to accept the inevitability of an outcome without changing minds.  
 Finally, the Security Council is suffused with power politics and structural inequality, and 
is an ideal setting in which to explore the interaction of coercive and argumentative modes of 
influence. It is therefore not surprising that the United States sought to leverage its privileged 
position within the UNSC to advance its goal of a global exemption from ICC jurisdiction. The 
US initiatives were explicitly linked to continued participation peacekeeping operations – in 
other words, a threat of material punishment. US diplomats first attempted unsuccessfully to 
incorporate an immunity provision into the May 2002 establishment of a UN peacekeeping 
mission in East Timor; when this failed, the US promptly withdrew its forces from the mission.58 
The stakes were much greater in the case of the UN Mission in Bosnia, which constituted one of 
the largest UN operations. As a State Party to the Rome Statute, alleged crimes committed on 
Bosnian territory by the national of any state would be subject to potential ICC jurisdiction, 
including the approximately 8000 US service members deployed as part of UNMIBH and 
associated NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR).59 Officials made clear that the United States 
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 would continue to block future resolutions that did not contain the desired immunity provision, 
and would withdraw their forces from those UN operations that did not enjoy suitable 
exemptions from ICC jurisdiction. Moreover, officials threatened to withhold the US’s 25% 
share of the UN peacekeeping operations budget should their demands go unheeded. 
Diplomacy at the Security Council must also be situated within a wider US policy of 
seeking global indemnity from the Court through a web of bilateral non-surrender agreements. 
These agreements—in which third party states agreed not to turn US service members over to the 
ICC—were negotiated via threats and incentives, as US law required that military aid and 
economic assistance be suspended to any states that refused to conclude a non-surrender 
arrangement.60 Hence, coercive tactics featured prominently in the US approach both inside and 
outside the Security Council, and ICC supporters faced real material costs in resisting US 
pressure. This generated a dilemma of whether to persist with their prior commitment to the ICC 
or concede to American demands, making the episode a key early test case for the US 
immunities strategy and the international response.  
 
Strategic Legal Argumentation in Motion: Resolutions 1422 and 1487  
The United States initially proposed language to amend the re-authorization of the UNMIBH 
mission that would have absolved US forces in perpetuity for acts committed as part of UN 
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 operations in Bosnia.61 The core thrust of the US position relied on political claims concerning 
the primacy of state sovereignty and its special role as a global military power.  
Contributing personnel to peacekeeping efforts demonstrates a commitment to 
international peace and security that, as you all know, can involve hardship and danger to 
those involved in peacekeeping. Having accepted these risks by exposing people to 
dangerous and difficult situations in the service of promoting peace and stability, we will 
not ask them to accept the additional risk of politicized prosecutions before a court whose 
jurisdiction over our people the Government of the United States does not accept.62 
 
In so doing, the US delegation only made passing reference to the prevailing legal context, 
highlighting immunity provisions in previous status of forces agreements and briefly asserting 
that Article 98 of the Rome Statute generically accommodated this practice.63  
The response from other UNSC members begins to demonstrate the analytical purchase 
of the strategic legal argumentation frame. Rather than conceding to US coercion at this early 
stage, ICC proponents instead offered a counter-proposal (attributed to France) that specifically 
invoked Article 16 of the Rome Statute, limiting prospective deferrals of ICC investigations or 
prosecutions ‘on a case by case basis’.” While this concession could be read as an effort to reach 
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 an acceptable position via a convergence of views—as accounts of bargaining would suggest—it 
is more properly understood as a strategic attempt to shift the diplomatic discourse onto the more 
favourable (for ICC proponents) legalized terrain of the Rome Statute. This move to a legal 
mode of argumentation substantially influenced the resulting diplomacy by narrowing the range 
of acceptable claims in subsequent debates. The United States initially persisted with its position, 
and when its effort failed to gain sufficient support within the Council the US vetoed the 
resulting draft resolution that excluded an immunity provision.64 This episode was significant, 
however, as it marked the turning point where the Rome Statute—and especially Article 16—
now became the primary reference point for effective strategic appeals.  
The defeat led the US to change its approach, and American diplomats adopted an 
explicitly legal mode of argumentation. The demand for an effectively blanket immunity from 
ICC prosecution was now premised on a claim that as a non-party, the United States had no legal 
obligations under the Rome Statute, and US nationals should therefore not be subject to ICC 
jurisdiction through its participation in UN operations. For the first time, the US also took pains 
to couch their claims in the more precise terms of the Rome Statute, arguing that Article 16 
permitted the exemptions they were seeking, and was consistent with the Security Council’s 
primary role in upholding international peace and security.65 US diplomats consequently 
introduced a new draft proposal that referenced Article 16 but simultaneously retained a quasi-
permanent exemption since the immunity provision would be automatically renewed annually 
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 “unless the Security Council decides otherwise.”66 This change can be understood as a strategic 
attempt to present the US position in terms that would be more acceptable to its audience – in 
other words, an effort to instrumentalize the justificatory language of law to serve pre-established 
policy goals. 
This effort did not result in an immediate concession as US representatives expected. The 
vast majority of states speaking at the meeting challenged to the US initiative through a 
discursive strategy that invoked both the specific legal criteria of the Rome Statute as well as 
broader principles of international law.67 First, they argued that the Statute already contained 
sufficient procedural checks and balances to effectively eliminate US concerns for politically 
motivated prosecutions.68 Second and more fundamentally, it was claimed that contrary to 
American assertions, the proposal for granting a priori immunity expressly violated the terms of 
Article 16 both because it envisioned an effectively permanent exemption irrespective of an 
ongoing ICC legal process and because it reversed the intention that renewal be done by an 
affirmative vote of the Council. 
[T]he proposals now circulating would have the Council, Lewis-Carroll-like, stand article 
16 of the Rome Statute on its head. The negotiating history makes clear that recourse to 
article 16 is on a case-by-case basis only, where a particular situation—for example the 
dynamic of a peace negotiation—warrants a 12-month deferral. The Council should not 
purport to alter that fundamental provision.69 
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 The language of the draft resolution—and hence the centrepiece of the US legal claim—was thus 
considered by most ICC parties to be fundamentally incompatible with the letter and intent of the 
Statute and hence contrary to objective of the Court.70 Finally, ICC proponents contended that 
the US position equating the international prosecution of citizens with a violation of state consent 
(the third party effect of treaties) was a misinterpretation of established law. Indeed, a variety of 
international treaties concerning torture, terrorism and hijacking already permit extra-national 
jurisdiction for individuals without their home state’s approval, yet this does not amount to a 
legally binding obligation on the state itself.71 In light of this, a host of ICC proponents suggested 
that adoption of the proposed Resolution would pose a threat to the integrity of the Rome Statute 
itself by placing unjustified burdens on the operation of the Court.72  
Yet the arguments also transcended the particular content of the Rome Statute to 
encompass more fundamental claims of legal equality and respect for norms regulating the 
modification of international legal instruments. On the one hand, the attempt to exempt an entire 
category of individuals—peacekeepers and affiliated personnel—was described as “enshrin[ing] 
an unconscionable double standard.”73 On the other hand, numerous countries argued that the US 
demand would set a precedent for the Security Council to unilaterally re-interpret existing 
multilateral agreements without the approval of the treaty parties, a power not envisioned in the 
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 UN Charter.74 Such an outcome, it was held, would force State Parties to violate their legal 
obligations under the Statute, and undercut the sovereign right of states to undertake binding 
legal commitments. The US proposal was thus portrayed as an extra-legal interference in the 
treaty making process, and an overreach of Security Council authority “that would destabilize 
and undermine the international legal regime” based on the principle of sovereign equality and 
the sanctity of legal agreements.75 This, in turn, could only serve to degrade the credibility of the 
Security Council by further politicizing its decisions.76  
Finally, delegates attempted to leverage US support for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia into a claim of inconsistency to further challenge the validity 
of the US position. They pointed out that the ICTY retained jurisdiction over all alleged crimes 
committed in Bosnia, so the concern regarding ICC authority was misplaced.77 But more 
fundamentally, if the US was satisfied with ceding authority—including, potentially, over its 
own soldiers—to one supra-national court, how could it justify its virulent opposition to the 
ICC? This rhetorical move conveniently neglected the fact that the ICTY was created by a 
UNSC resolution and thus remained (though at arms length) under its purview, which was 
precisely why the US could countenance the Tribunal. The strategic positioning of this claim was 
therefore not intended to advance a reasoned process of truth-seeking leading to a convergence 
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 of views, but instead to further box the US into a socially unsustainable position. Irrespective of 
this deliberate oversight, charges of hypocrisy forced US representatives into further defence of 
their proposal that later proved consequential in limiting US policy options. The most obvious 
rejoinder—that the US only accepted international justice when it could control the outcomes via 
its Security Council veto—was politically undesirable as it was obviously unlikely to appeal to 
the majority of ICC supporters.  
Despite the stakes and apparent vehement opposition from the majority of participating 
states, Resolution 1422 was approved by a unanimous vote. A sceptical reading would suggest—
as per the alternative explanation to this study—that international law served merely as a 
convenient forum for airing grievances, but did not ultimately affect the policy outcome sought 
by the most powerful actor.78 Undoubtedly Resolution 1422 was passed under extreme duress as 
the US employed extensive coercion in the form of prospective sanctions (the withdrawal of US 
forces and funding from UN operations) to gain acquiescence to its demands. Yet an emphasis 
on material power in isolation fails to appreciate the extent to which the shift into legal 
argumentation constrained US options in pursuing its global immunities policy. First, ICC 
supporters could have simply accepted the initial US proposal in order to avoid the prospect of 
substantial punishment. Yet the overwhelming majority of states instead chose to challenge US 
policy through an alternative assemblage of legal arguments anchored around Rome Statute 
Article 16. This strategic reframing occasioned a shift in emphasis to the legal criteria of the 
Statute itself, thereby drawing the US into a debate on the terms of an institution it openly 
opposed. 
                                                 
78 Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power; Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of 
International Law. 
 Second and relatedly, the opposition faced within the Security Council compelled the 
United States delegation to hew more closely to the wording of Article 16, which in turn implied 
substantial concessions limiting the impact of the exemption. Recall that the US initially sought 
permanent immunity for all nationals deployed in the Bosnian peacekeeping missions. The US 
draft text thus included an effectively automatic annual renewal, since cancellation was subject 
to an affirmative Security Council vote in which the US held veto power.79 At the same time, the 
initial US proposal employed the more authoritative formulation of “decides” that is typical of 
Chapter VII resolutions; this was meant to underscore the pre-eminence of the Council in 
requiring the Court to defer any future investigation relating to non-party nationals. Yet at the 
insistence of pro-ICC states, Resolution 1422 authorized only a more modest one-year 
exemption that could be renewed via a further resolution and incorporated Article 16’s use of 
“requests” vis-à-vis the Council and Court. These were significant modifications since they 
placed the US demand under regular scrutiny, ensuring that representatives would have to 
continue to engage in public justifications on the terms of the Rome Statute. The US concession 
was made necessary by the institutional context of the Security Council and the requirement of 
nine affirmative votes (and no vetoes from permanent members); yet the particular content of the 
final resolution was profoundly shaped by the prior argumentation in which the initial US claim 
failed to out-manoeuvre the contending position. The successful attempt by ICC supporters to 
bring UNSC 1422 under the aegis of Article 16 thus shifted the balance between claimants, 
deemphasizing the US demand that the Security Council should dominate the Court in favour of 
greater equity between two independent bodies and consequently restraining the exercise of US 
power.   
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 Finally, while the US strategy of combining coercion and argumentation did yield some 
success, it also had the unintended consequence of reinforcing the move to a legal discourse that 
did not favour the US position over the long term. The diplomatic record demonstrates that ICC 
supporters assessed the US initiative on the merits, and thus employed legal criteria as an 
alternative source of legitimate authority in deciding on the content of the resolution. Only three 
states—China, India and Russia—endorsed the content of the US position in the Council 
discussions before voting was held on the 2002 draft resolution. This is contrasted with 32 states, 
including two speaking on behalf of major regional organizations, which did not accept that the 
resolution accurately reflected the letter or intent of the Rome Statute. While the American shift 
to legal arguments did not change minds, the deference to a legal framing was crucial in strategic 
terms as it provided other states with the minimally acceptable grounds required to justify their 
temporary yielding to US demands, even though the decision was motivated by other concerns. 
This is the essence of the strategic account advanced here. At the same time, such discursive 
moves are “sticky” in the sense that once activated they are difficult to abandon, a fact that 
would prove highly relevant to subsequent developments. 
One year later, the United States was able to secure a further one-year extension of the 
UNMIBH immunity provision with the approval of Resolution 1487.80 Here again there was 
little acceptance of the US view, as the overwhelming majority of states spoke against the 
resolution.81 The modes of argumentation followed a similar form, though with some important 
changes that hold implications for the integrity of the ICC. The US again argued that the 
resolution was compatible with the Rome Statute and the fundamental principles of consent and 
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 the limit of third party effects in international law. Yet the American representative also sought 
to challenge the Court’s legitimacy through an invocation of the constitutive structures of the 
international system. The reading of Article 16 advocated by ICC proponents would “challeng[e] 
and weak[en] the United Nations Charter system and the Council’s place in it;”82 the US 
interpretation, by contrast, was presented as returning the UNSC to its appropriate position of 
primacy. The US also revisited the theme of peace and security, and argued that the spectre of 
ICC jurisdiction—without the limits provided in Resolutions 1422 and 1487—could have a 
chilling effect on the future efficacy of UN peacekeeping operations by imperilling the 
participation of non-ICC members. 
 Supporters of the Court again contested the US position on largely the same legal 
grounds, by reiterating the Rome Statute’s safeguards against politicized prosecutions,83 and 
challenging the US interpretation of Article 16 of the Rome Statute84 and its resulting implication 
concerning the Security Council’s role in interpreting multilateral treaties.85 As such, the 
majority of the Council again found that the US demands were inconsistent with the Rome 
Statute, UN Charter, and more fundamental principles of international law. Finally, Court 
proponents invoked a new claim that Resolution 1487 and its predecessor were context-specific 
and temporary exceptions that did not constitute a legal or political precedent for future 
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 exemptions.86 The statements made particular reference to the exceptional circumstances and 
noted that the annual renewals should not be regarded as automatic or pre-determined. Hence the 
immunity provision was not normalized even as the international system’s highest political body 
again conceded to US pressure.  
 The successful limits placed on US policy would prove highly consequential the 
following year, as the Security Council again deliberated a renewal of the UN mission in Bosnia 
and with it, the contested exemption of US personnel. Yet in the intervening period, a series of 
revelations concerning American policies in the War on Terror undercut the US negotiating 
position. In particular, the release of photographs documenting serious abuses at Abu Ghraib 
Prison in Iraq drew widespread condemnation, and further increased scrutiny on US efforts at the 
Security Council. In light of this, the United States announced that it would not seek a further 
renewal immunity provision as a precondition for approving the extension of UN operations in 
Bosnia. In doing so, US representatives indicated that while they had not changed their views 
regarding the ICC, they equally recognized that members of the Council were no longer willing 
to support their demands.87 This reversal cannot be adequately explained solely in reference to 
changes in external conditions. Legal protections for US nationals remained an active concern: 
by 2004 roughly 1000 American military personnel were deployed in Bosnia as part of the 
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 NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) and hence the value of a further Security Council 
resolution had not abated.88  
Rather, the US decision can only be understood by taking into account the social context 
of diplomacy and especially the legal criteria that informed successful strategic argumentation. 
While global publicity surrounding US abuses undoubtedly weakened the US negotiating 
position, this development was consequential not instead, but because of the interconnected 
nature of legal reasoning and justification. The United States had sought to oppose the ICC 
jurisdictional regime on the grounds that it did not accord with established international law. Yet 
conduct in Iraq and elsewhere exposed widespread human rights violations that undermined the 
credibility of US claims to good faith respect for the law. Other states were consequently even 
less inclined to conditionally accept US interpretations in the Bosnia case, precisely because the 
immunities issue was assessed in the context of a wider international law discourse. It was in this 
sense that the subsequently revealed hypocrisy proved politically consequential: as external 
events reinforced the legal basis informing judgements over American immunities policy, the 
social costs associated with its continuation became intolerable. Yet this was only relevant 
because previous manoeuvres by the pro-ICC constituency had already successfully limited the 
immunities provision to annual non-automatic renewals. The decision not to further extend the 
resolution in 2004 is therefore crucial, since it prevented the substantiation of the US position as 
a fait accompli.89  
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 Had US coercive power been sufficient on its own, we would expect the international 
community to continue its begrudging acceptance of US demands for special exemption from 
ICC jurisdiction even if the principled case became less favourable. Instead, the decision to 
deploy legal argumentation in the pursuit of its immunities objective had the unanticipated 
consequence of boxing the US into a defence of its policy on specific grounds from which it 
subsequently found it difficult to extract itself. When the widening gap between words and deeds 
became apparent, the US had little room for rhetorical manoeuvre. Put differently, strategic 
argumentation by pro-ICC constituency made the political conditions inhospitable for the US 
position, and the United States consequently altered its policy in order to avoid additional 
diplomatic damage.  
 
Subsequent Developments  
More recent developments within the Security Council have continued the debate over US 
immunity policy. Successive resolutions creating a UN peacekeeping force Liberia and referring 
the situations in Darfur and Libya to the ICC Prosecutor have contained an operative clause that 
provides a permanent exemption for nationals of non-party states from ICC jurisdiction.90 This 
was regarded by American representatives as legal affirmation of their previous position and a 
precedent for future deliberations.91 The debate in these three cases largely mirrored the 
discourse surrounding Resolutions 1422 and 1487, raising the question as to whether the United 
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 States has succeeded in manoeuvring other states into a de facto acknowledgement of a 
permanent non-party exemption from the ICC. 
Subsequent discourse reveals a mixed picture, but one in which the US strategy has failed 
to fundamentally alter international practice regarding immunities. As in the Bosnia case, ICC 
proponents again accepted the US demand on the grounds that its negative implications were 
outweighed by the immediate necessity of addressing ongoing violence in Liberia, Sudan and 
Libya.92 The inclusion of an immunity provision was therefore due to the combined effect of 
material threats and the inclusion of minimally acceptable legal language that provided a pretext 
for the concession. A number of delegations thus explicitly asserted that their approval of the 
resolutions did not represent a precedent for future situations, despite US assertions to the 
contrary.93 Yet the evidence equally does not support a view that US efforts have generated a 
sufficiently widespread or stable acceptance of its position as successful strategic argumentation 
would require. Since the immunities campaign began in 2002, there have been 217 UN Security 
Council resolutions authorizing or renewing peacekeeping operations; of that substantial list, 
only the five mentioned above contain provisions exempting non-party nationals, or UN 
personnel more broadly, from ICC jurisdiction. When considered in this light, the short-term 
concessions from pro-ICC states resemble isolated tactical accommodations rather than a 
genuine shift in the international status quo. And significantly for my theory, states have not 
been boxed into an unsustainable position by US efforts, but have rather continued to contest its 
policy on principled grounds. Given the enduring prevalence of coercion in US foreign policy 
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 more generally, this suggests that the strategic invocation of legal argumentation has limited the 
scope of US power and thus generated outcomes that are notably different than would be 
expected had material power trumped principled discourse. 
Rather, US efforts have arguably had the inverse—and unintended—consequence of 
increasing the profile of the ICC as a competent feature of the international system. As Stahn has 
noted, “by pushing for the adoption of Resolution 1422 (2002) the US has incidentally 
recognized that the jurisdiction of the ICC extends to nationals of third states.”94 This had 
significant repercussions, as US representatives were increasingly subject to claims of hypocrisy 
in allowing other non-party nationals (in Sudan and Libya) to be subject to a Court from which 
they themselves were exempted. Legalized argumentation has thus led to a form of rhetorical 
entrapment that further undermined the prospects that the global audience of states will accept 
the US position. Recognition of the US failure to undermine the ICC immunities regime has 
compounded during the Obama administration, which has signalled a more open—though not 
fully supportive—approach to the Court and has clearly seen no political benefit in reviving its 
legal contestation. This in turn demonstrates the often subtle, but politically significant, role that 
legal rhetoric plays in shaping state policy. 
 
Conclusion: The Power of Legal Argumentation in World Politics 
Scholars have noted the prevalence of legal discourses in international relations, yet the impact 
of principled interventions remains a subject of considerable debate. This article contributes to 
theoretical conceptions of argumentation by highlighting the distinctive structure and effects of 
legal claim making, and provides empirical evidence to support its account through a close 
attention to diplomatic practices in a particularly challenging case. As anticipated by my theory, 
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 legal standards served as a reservoir of legitimacy for actors to exploit in debates over the ICC 
immunities regime. Competing claims were positioned in relation to a set of legal principles that 
in turn conditioned the success or failure of policy efforts: most fundamentally, the United States 
was unable to manoeuvre other states into accepting its terms (and abandoning their own 
position) because its principled claims were not regarded as sufficiently compelling. Inversely, 
the strategic manoeuvring by ICC proponents generated political conditions in which the 
immunities campaign was no longer regarded as worth the political costs. The strategic 
employment of legal arguments thus contributed to political outcomes by increasing the social 
sustainability of certain policies and consequently diminishing that of others. The resulting 
accommodations emerged as a response to the political environment generated by these 
diplomatic episodes, and without changes in underlying beliefs.  
This account does not contend that material power ceases to matter in a legal context, or 
that international law operates independent of political, economic and social forces in the 
international system. As the case study shows, the US deployed coercion alongside its discursive 
claims, and these tactics in combination did achieve a largely favourable outcome initially. Yet 
US material power—whether alone or in concert with argumentation—was not decisive in the 
immunities debates, as other states did not accept the full range of US demands despite extensive 
pressure. Rather, the adoption of an argumentative frame based in law transformed the resulting 
diplomacy in ways that the United States could not fully control and that ultimately led to 
outcomes that were successively further from the initial US position. The self-interested use of 
law thus cut both ways, as the strategy exposed US diplomats to countervailing arguments that 
progressively focused around an interpretation of how the ICC—especially in Article 16—
related to wider principles of criminal accountability and the role of the UNSC in global order. 
 This foreclosed certain types of claims that could no longer be squared with these standards, 
thereby narrowing the range of subsequent policy options available to US diplomats.  
Material resources were therefore constrained by the parameters of acceptable legal 
argumentation that in turn provided a resource for other, less powerful actors to counter US 
coercion via alternative claims and without corresponding material capabilities. ICC proponents 
successfully reconstructed the terms of the debate to emphasize the Rome Statute as the sine qua 
non for assessing an acceptable argument. In this specialized context, US claims were judged as 
not being sufficiently in conformance with the prevailing legal criteria by most states engaged in 
the discussions. This did not prevent concessions to US power in the form of Resolutions 1422 
and 1487, but it did ensure both that the resolutions were more limited than American officials 
had demanded and that subsequent debates would continue to take place on the terms of the 
Rome Statute. Thus even a dominant military power like the United States can face 
consequences when its behaviour is judged to contradict community standards. These forms of 
constraint are a crucial part of the story that would be obscured if focusing on American material 
preponderance in isolation. In these respects the ICC has proven more resilient than many would 
have anticipated, and this is particularly surprising given the scepticism that the Court could 
exert influence in the face of sustained US pressure.95  
Finally, this study reinforces the constructivist intuition that social modes of power exist 
alongside material and instrumental forms that are more typically the interest of realist and 
institutionalist IR scholars.96 The shift to law valorizes principled justification and devalues 
claims based in naked self-interest or coercion. The invocation of legal claims thus tempers the 
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 use of threats or incentives, and the deployment of material power resources has different—and 
more modest—effects than it would outside an argumentative and especially legal context. 
Hence one important way that law matters in international relations is by providing an alternative 
environment in which the self-interested pursuit of policy goals may develop, which in turn 
sheds light on the power of legal argumentation in world politics. 
 
